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Relational Contracts and the Economic Well-Being of Nations
* 
 
Informal long-term relationships and mutual confidence play a crucial role in modern 
economies in at least two dimensions. First, the performance of firms is strongly affected by 
their capacity to solve organizational questions effectively and this capacity is apparently 
strongly related to their ability to maintain informal long-term relationships. Second, countries 
that are better at maintaining unwritten agreements and where interactions are more strongly 
guided by a sense of trust fare better in terms of economic welfare than others. This paper 
provides a simple general equilibrium model which reconciles these two findings: we offer a 
micro-founded explanation of how the trust that prevails in an economy gets transmitted into 
higher economic well-being and we thereby highlight the role of managers with low time 
preference. Our analysis builds on the model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and a 
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1  Introduction 
Informal long-term relationships and mutual confidence play a crucial role in modern economies 
as is highlighted in two key findings. First, the performance of firms, as measured by indicators 
of  productivity  or  profitability,  is  strongly  related  to  their  capacity  to  solve  organizational 
questions effectively and this capacity, in turn, is apparently strongly related to their ability to 
engage  in  informal  long-term  relationships.  Second,  countries  that  are  better  at  maintaining 
unwritten agreements and in which interactions are more strongly guided by a sense of trust fare 
better in terms of economic welfare than other countries. 
This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model which reconciles these two observations. 
We build  on  the notion that  a  country’s  economic  well-being is intimately  connected to  the 
performance of its firms since these transfer productive factors into final goods and services that 
serve the  needs  of its  citizens.  In  our  model,  firms  whose  managers  have low  rates  of  time 
preference maintain efficient long-term relational contracts and, for this reason, perform better 
than  firms  which  are  run  by  more  short-sighted  agents.  Furthermore,  countries  which  are 
endowed with a higher share of long-term oriented managers exhibit higher social welfare. 
Start with the first empirical finding. There is a large organizational literature which documents 
that  firms  exhibit  astounding  performance  differences  in  terms  of  their  productivity  or 
profitability even after controlling for differences in conventionally measured inputs, technology 
and local market conditions (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). Seemingly similar firms exhibit 
persistent  performance  differences  as  Beaulieu  et  al.  (2010)  have  put  it.
1  How  can  these 
differences be explained? A solid body of empirical work documents that ‘management matters’: 
management practices differ widely in many dimensions and, hence, are key for an understanding 
of productivity differences across firms. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010), for example, offer 
an 18-item list of management practices that are associated with good firm performance.
2 Of 
course, this finding raises a crucial follow-up question: why should it not be possible to simply 
                                                 
1 The point comes out in impressive clarity in an intra-firm study by Chew et al. (1990). They looked at 40 operating 
units of a large firm that are highly similar in that all sites utilize the same technology, employ low-skilled labour, 
are located in the United States, serve fairly similar customers and produce fairly similar products. They found that 
the most productive units are twice as productive as the least productive ones, after accounting for a number of 
observable  differences  (e.g.  age  and  size  of  plants,  market  size,  labor  markets,  quality  of  output  etc.).  Similar 
findings have been corroborated in Argote et al. (1990), Henderson and Cockburn (1996), Ichniowski et al. (1997). 
See Beaulieu et al. (2010) for an extensive survey. 
2  Their  list  comprises  factors  such  as  the  introduction  of  modern  manufacturing  techniques,  process  problem 
documentation,  performance  tracking,  review  and  dialogue,  managing,  retaining  and  attracting  human  capital,   2 
imitate and adopt the best-practice management techniques? Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) find 
that  imperfectly  competitive  markets,  family  ownership  of  firms,  restrictive  regulations  and 
informational barriers are conducive to bad management practices, whilst general education and 
multinational  presence  are  favorable  for  good  management  practices.  Without  denying  the 
importance of these factors, this hardly seems to be the full answer. A recent strand of research 
therefore emphasizes that possibly the main explanation for the perceived differences roots in an 
idea which was suggested by Stewart Macaulay (1963: 58) in a classic piece: “Businessmen often 
rely on ‘a man's word’ in a brief letter, a hand-shake, or ‘common honesty and decency’ – even 
when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks.” In this view, superior practices are the 
fruit of such informal relational contracts which by their very nature are hard to detect from 
outside and even harder to imitate (Gibbons et al. 2010).
3 
The second finding that we have put forward above provides a strong further reason to focus on 
relational contracts: the economic well-being is higher in countries where informal relationships 
and trust play a stronger role. The idea that trustworthy relations are an important pillar for a 
society’s economic success has a long tradition in the political and economic sciences.
4 As Arrow 
(1972: 357) has put it: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that 
much  of  the  economic  backwardness  in  the  world  can  be  explained  by  the  lack  of  mutual 
confidence [...].” In particular, a high correlation between countries' GDP per capita or its growth 
rate  and  different  measures  of  trust  and  trustworthiness  have  been  found  in  many  studies.
5 
Clearly, causality could run eihter way, i.e. good economic perfomance could be the outcome of 
mutual confidence just as high levels of trust could be the result of higher levels of economic 
well-being. However, a recent analysis by Algan and Cahuc (2010) provides strong evidence that 
‘trust’ is the cause of economic development, not the other way around.
6 
                                                                                                                                                              
rewarding high performance and removing poor performers. 
3 A large literature shows that relational contracting is an important mechanism governing commercial transactions 
in developing and in developed countries. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson et al. (2002) find relational 
contracting to be the main governance mechanism in Vietnam, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and the Ukraine. 
Even in countries with well-functioning legal systems courts are used mostly as a last resort in dispute settlement 
(Galanter 1981; Williamson 1983). 
4 See Arrow (1972), Gambetta (1988), Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1993). 
5 See, in particular, Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et al. (1997) and Dincer and Uslaner (2010). 
6 We interpret the facts in the sense that the long-term orientiation and trustworthiness that prevails in business 
relationships is also reflected in higher measures of ‘trust’ on the aggregatet level as e.g. measured by the World 
Values Survey (WVS). We are aware that some studies which are based on experimental settings question the WVS 
measure of trust (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2000; Lazzarini et al. 2003). However, the result of these studies has been   3 
We reconcile these findings within a simple general equilibrium model with four key features 
which are pervasive in modern production and organization processes. First, we assume that the 
production  process  is  fragmented  in  the  sense  that  the  final  output  is  produced  with  two 
intermediate inputs, headquarter services (managers) and components. Second, firms, managed 
by headquarters, have to decide on the ownership structure, i.e. whether to integrate component 
suppliers (integration) or to acquire components through an arm’s length transaction on markets 
(outsourcing). The choice between the two is dictated by hold-up problems that emerge when the 
intermediate inputs are relationship-specific, have no value outside the relationship and when 
contracts are incomplete as in the Property Rights Theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Hart and Moore 1990). We build on Antràs and Helpman (2004) to capture these first two key 
features.  Third,  in  order  to  allow  long-term  relationships  to  emerge,  we  embed  this  static 
framework into an infinitely repeated game similarly to Baker et al. (2002). This gives rise to two 
governance regimes: firms can either enter a relational agreement with the supplier once and 
forever (relational contracting) and thereby mitigate hold-up problems or they can negotiate in 
each period on the spot and thereby be stuck with hold-up problems as in the one-shot game (spot 
contracting). Overall, our analysis thus allows for four organizational modes, spot integration 
and outsourcing and relational integration and outsourcing. Fourth, we assume that firms are 
heterogeneous with respect to the time preference of their management
7 and with respect to their 
productivity as in Melitz (2003). We would like to make it clear at the outset that none of our 
central findings crucially depends on the notion of firm heterogeneity with respect to technology. 
In fact, it will be seen that a firm’s technology, while being an important characteristic, does not 
influence the organizational capabilities of the firms. To show this, we incorporate this type of 
heterogeneity in the model. 
We obtain the following results. First and foremost, we show that long-term oriented managers 
are key for the superior performance of firms and the superior development of countries in terms 
of economic welfare. The reason for the superior performance of firms is that managers with low 
rate of time preference are able to maintain long-term relational contracts which mitigate (avoid) 
                                                                                                                                                              
challenged in more recent works (Fehr et al. 2003; Bellemare and Kroeger 2003). Furthermore, it may be questioned 
whether the concept of trust that emerges in experimental studies is really able capture the spirit of long-term 
relationships that prevail in business practice. See also Sapienza et al. (2008) on these issues. 
7 Poterba and Summers (1995) provide anecdotic evidence for the differences in time horizons between CEO’s. 
Several empirical studies provide evidence for heterogeneity of time preference rates on the individual level (e.g. 
Lawrance 1991, Samwick 1998, Warner and Pleeter 2001, Frederick et al. 2002).   4 
inefficiencies associated with hold-up problems in production. Removing such inefficiencies on 
the firm level transmits into higher aggregate welfare. Countries which have a larger share of 
managers with long-term orientation have higher welfare than countries where such managers are 
rare. Hence, we provide a micro-founded explanation of how the establishment of trustful mutual 
relations that is made possible by long-term oriented managers feeds into into higher economic 
well-being. 
Second, we are able to show that in our full general equilibrium model the basic make-or-buy 
decision  is  similar  under  relational  contracting  as  under  spot  contracting:  if  the  headquarter 
intensity in production exceeds a well-defined threshold level, firms prefer relational integration 
to relational outsourcing whereas the opposite holds below this threshold. 
Third,  we  derive  a  fundamental  separation  theorem:  for  any  given  productivity  level, 
headquarters with low time preference are able to reap the fruits of relational contracts whereas 
those  with  high  time  preference  are  stuck  with  spot  contracts.  Hence,  we  obtain  persistent 
performance  differences  between  (technologically)  similar  firms  in  our  general  equilibrium 
model. 
Fourth,  our  analysis  endogenously  explains  the  coexistence  of  organizational  modes  on  the 
industry level - integration and outsourcing both in firms governed by spot contracting and by 
relational contracting. 
Fifth, we show how the technology of firms interacts with their organizational capabilities in 
general equilibrium. Our model predicts that short-sighted firms need to be on average more 
technologically versed than more efficiently organized long-term oriented ones in order to be able 
to compete with the latter. This finding poses a challenge for empirical research.
8 
Related  literature.  Our  paper  relates  to  several  strands  of  research.  First,  the  concept  of 
relational contracting that underlies our analysis has strong ties with the notion of ‘trust’ which is 
the subject of a substantive literature. One line of this literature uses the repeated game approach 
to  formalize  an  economic  concept  of  trust  and  trustworthiness  (James  Jr.  2002).  Trust  and 
                                                 
8 Empirical work has so far addressed the link between the sorting pattern of organizational forms on the industry 
level and firms’ productivities as predicted by Antràs and Helpman (2004). Nunn and Trefler (2008) and Kohler and 
Smolka (2009) find the particular sorting pattern predicted by Antràs and Helpman (2004) in the data. Defever and 
Toubal (2007) find the opposite sorting pattern, however. It should be noted that these studies use different kinds of 
total factor productivity as independent variable, thus, capturing the  effects both of firm technology and better 
management practices on the organizational modes.   5 
relational contracts are used almost interchangeable in this approach, as exemplified by McLeods 
(2007: 609) characterization: “In a relational contract, one party trusts the other when the value 
from future trade is greater than the one period gain from defection.“ In accordance with this 
reasoning the model by Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) equates trust with the discount factor. In terms 
of our model this would amount to take the managers’ rate of time preference as an expression of 
their level of trust or trustworthiness. Clearly, this would be a narrow notion of trust. In general, 
trust is seen as a multifaceted concept (see e.g. the contributions in Gambetta 1988). 
Second,  we  build  on  the  theoretical  work  in  organizational  economics  that  relates  the 
organizational design of firms to their ability to enforce relation-based contracts (see the recent 
surveys by Hart 2002, MacLeod 2007 and Malcomson 2010). Specifically, we build on Baker et 
al. (2002) and Halonen (2002) in implementing a repeated game approach to overcome the hold-
up problem.
9 In contrast to this literature, which uses partial equilibrium approaches to address 
single  firms,  our  main  concern  are  the  aggregate  consequences  that  emerge  in  general 
equilibrium,  i.e.  aggregate  welfare  and  the  sorting  of  firms  in  terms  of  their  organizational 
strategies in general equilibrium. 
Third,  there  is  an  emerging  literature  which  addresses  aggregate  consequences  of  the 
organizational choices of firms with seminal works by Antràs (2003), and Antràs and Helpman 
(2004).
10  We  build  on  this  work,  as  we  already  have  made  clear.  This  literature  has  not 
considered  the  notion  of  relational  contracting,  however.  In  fact,  our  contribution  can  be 
interpreted as introducing relational contracting in the form of a repeated game into this literature. 
Finally, there is an emerging literature which addresses the link between trust, relational contracts 
on the one hand and welfare and development on the other hand. Our analysis highlights the role 
of  (long-term  oriented)  managers  to  explain  how  the  trust  that  prevails  in  an  economy  is 
transmitted into higher economic well-being.
11 Clearly, there are other transmission mechanisms 
as  well.  Guiso  et  al.  (2004)  show  that  trust  has  a  positive  effect  on  financial  development. 
Moreover, trust also positively affects entrepreneurship (Guiso et al. 2006) and international trade 
and FDI flows (Guiso et al. 2009; Araujo and Ornelas 2007).
12 
                                                 
9 Felli et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that higher levels of trust lead to higher supplier’s investments in 
relationships between down- and up-stream firms. 
10 See also Antràs and Helpman (2008) and the surveys by Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) and Helpman (2006). 
11 See Dixit (2004) for a general theoretical treatment of the endogenous emergence of welfare enhancing institutions 
with social norms based on honesty or trust and the seminal empirical work by Greif (1993, 1994, 2006). 
12 There is also a related literature which studies the effect of different measures of institutional quality (e.g., legal   6 
The paper's structure is as follows. The basic model is laid out in section 2. We start with the 
benchmark case of perfectly enforceable contracts and then we turn to spot contracting under 
contractual  incompleteness.  Section  3  characterizes  the  general  equilibrium  both  for  the 
benchmark case and for the case of contractual incompleteness. Section 4 introduces relational 
contracts and derives our main theorems. Section 5 briefly concludes. 
2  The model 
2.1  General set-up 
We set up a tractable version of the model by Antràs and Helpman (2004) which integrates the 
Property Rights Theory of the firm by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) 
into the trade model of Melitz (2003). We consider a single closed economy populated by  L 
workers. Labor is the only factor of production and each worker supplies one unit. There are two 
industries, a traditional and a modern one.
13 The traditional industry produces a homogeneous 
good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. This good is the numéraire. The 
modern industry produces a continuum of differentiated varieties under monopolistic competition 
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each variety is produced by a single firm under increasing returns 
to scale and firms are heterogeneous in their productivity as in Melitz (2003).  
2.2  Preferences and demand 
Preferences are given by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility:
14  
  [ ]
a a m
1/
0 d ) ( = , ln = i i x X X x U
N i ∫Î +   (1) 
where  0 x   is  consumption  of  the  homogeneous  good,  X   denotes  an  index  of  aggregate 
consumption of differentiated varieties  ) (i x  and  N  represents the mass of available varieties of 
the  modern  good  (which  will  be  determined  endogeneously)  and  0 > m   and  1 < < 0 a   are 
parameters. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by  ) 1/(1 a s - º . 
Households maximize their utility given the budget constraint  Y x PX = 0 + , where a household's 
                                                                                                                                                              
enforcement of contracts) on the comparative advantage and the pattern of trade (Acemoglu et al. 2007, Costinot 
2007, Levchenko 2007 and Nunn 2007). 
13 The model is easily extended to include many modern industries along the lines of Antràs and Helpman (2004), 
but the focus on two industries suffices for our purposes. 
14 We depart here from Antràs and Helpman (2004) in order to gain tractability. The logarithmic quasi-linear utility 
function is a special case of the more general quasi-linear upper tier utility function  ( ) m
m / 0 X x U + =  that they use.   7 
income is given by Y  and where the aggregate price index P is defined by  
  [ ] , d ) (
) 1/(1 1 s s - -
Î ∫ º i i p P
N i   (2) 
with  ) (i p  denoting the price of variety  i. Standard utility maximization implies the demand 
functions 
1 =
- P X m  and  m - Y x = 0  for the manufacturing aggregate and the numéraire good, 
respectively. We assume that  Y < m  in order to ensure positive consumption of the numéraire. 
Plugging the demand functions into (1) yields indirect utility  1) ln ( ln = - + - m m m P Y V .  
Total demand for each variety  i is obtained by aggregating individual demands across the  L 
workers. This gives rise to the inverse demand function 
  . ) ( = ) (
1 1 a a a m
- - - L X i x i p   (3) 
Total revenue of each variety is then 
a a a m
- - 1 ) ( = ) ( ) ( = ) ( L X i x i x i p i R . Note that the aggregate 
consumption index  X  is exogenous from the viewpoint of a single producer but it is endogenous 
for the industry and will be determined in the industry equilibrium (see section 3). 
2.3  Technologies and entry 
Traditional good. The numéraire good is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition  with  a  unit  labor  input  requirement.  This  pins  down  the  wage  at  unity  in  this 
economy. 
Modern industry. The production of each variety  i of the differentiated modern good takes 
place  under  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  it  requires  two  customized  relationship-specific 
inputs, headquarter services  ) (i h  supplied by headquarters  H  and components  ( ) i m  supplied by 
manufacturers  M .
15 These two intermediate inputs are themselves produced with one unit of 
labor per unit of output, each. 
Before production can take place fixed investments (in terms of labor) of  H f  and  M f  have to be 
incurred by the headquarter and the component supplier, respectively. Departing from Antràs and 
Helpman  (2004)  we  assume  that  these  fixed  investments  are  invariant  with  respect  to  the 
organizational options that we characterize below.
16 The two variety-specific intermediate inputs 
                                                 
15 Labor is the only factor of production here, so these agents can be understood as representing bundles of labor. 
16 Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that these fixed costs are ownership-specific. They do so to obtain a co-
existence of organizational forms in industry equilibrium. Arguably, this ad-hoc assumption sits uncomfortably with 
the idea of a ‘unified theory of the firm’ envisaged by Grossman and Hart (1986), however (cf. section 4.5). As will   8 
are  then  combined  to  produce  variety  i  of  the  final  good  according  to  the  Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
  1. < < 0 ,
1
) ( ) (

















 i m i h
i i x   (4) 
The parameter h is industry-specific and represents the headquarter intensity in the production of 
variety i. The parameter  ) (i q  gives the firm-specific productivity similarly to Melitz (2003). We 
assume that firms are represented and run by the respective headquarters. Hence,  ) (i q  can be 
understood to be the ability of a headquarter firm to combine both inputs into a single final good. 
If the headquarter decides in favor of production, he seeks a component producer to cooperate 
with and decides about the organizational structure of the firm. This involves the choice between 
integration  of  the  component  supplier  or  outsourcing,  i.e.  an  arm's  length  transaction  on  the 
market. The precise timing and the specifics of the organizational options will be specified fully 
below. Using (3) and (4) the joint revenue from cooperation of  H  and M  is given by: 
  ( ) .
1
) ( ) (























i m i h
i i R   (5) 
The process of entry in this differentiated goods industry involves two steps as in Melitz (2003). 
Prior to entry, there is a large pool of potential firms (headquarters) who can enter the modern 
sector subject to an entry investment in terms of labor  E f  which is sunk thereafter. The firm  i 
then draws its productivity  ) (i q  from a commonly known distribution function  ) (q G . We call 
this the productivity lottery. Depending on this draw and the prevailing industrial structure a 
headquarter decides to immediately exit or to start production. To save on notation, we drop the 
variety index i from now on. 
2.4  Investment decisions and profits under perfectly enforceable contracts 
The  two  inputs  are  relationship-specific  and we  assume  that  they  have  no  value  outside  the 
specific relationship. If contracts are incomplete, these assumptions entail hold-up problems that 
we take up in section 2.5. In this section we address the benchmark case in which courts can 
perfectly verify and enforce contracts so that the investment decisions of the two parties are 
undistorted.  Call  this  the  first-best  solution  from  the  point  of  view  of  producers.
17  This 
                                                                                                                                                              
become clear below, we obtain different organizational forms in equilibrium without resorting to this assumption. 
17Clearly, this is not the first-best solution from the point of view of the economy since firms have monopoly power.   9 
benchmark serves as a reference point in our analysis of spot contracts and it plays a crucial role 
in the analysis of relational contracts that we undertake in section 4. 
With full contractibility, the contracting parties  H  and  M  can ex ante stipulate the levels of 
investments  into  headquarter  services  and  manufacturing  components,  which  maximize  joint 
firm's  profit  f h m m h R m h - - - ) , ( = ) , ( p ,  where  H M f f f + º .  Using  (5),  standard  profit 
maximization yields the optimal investments (the agents are compensated with their marginal 
revenue product for their variable factor input) 








Q - Q X AEL m X AEL h   (6) 
where  a
a
a - º 1 A  and  a m - º 1
1
E . The parameter  a
a
q - º Q 1  is an alternative measure of productivity. 
Using (6) in (5) gives first-best revenue  




QX AEL R   (7) 






q p   (8) 
where  1 > 1/a  is the monopoly mark-up over marginal costs ( q 1/ ). Joint pure profits in the first-
best case can then be obtained using (6) and (7):  




a q p   (9) 
The distribution of profits is immaterial in this first-best case since the variable labor inputs of the 
agents are rewarded with their marginal revenue products which induces optimal investment and 
since their fixed investments  H M f f f + º  are compensated as expressed by (9). 
If contracts are perfectly verified and enforced by courts, the organizational structure does not 
matter. Any allocation that can be implemented through a given organizational form could be 
implemented  within  any  other  ownership  structure  through  the  appropriate  choice  of  a 
comprehensive contract. However, this is no more the case if contracts are incomplete. 
2.5  Contractual incompleteness 
2.5.1  Assumptions 
Incomplete contracts. In practice, courts are unable to perfectly verify and enforce the quality of   10 
investments into headquarter services and manufacturing components. Since the investments of 
the two parties are assumed to be relationship-specific and have no value outside the relationship, 
hold-up problems emerge. We address these with the Property Rights Theory of the firm along 
the lines of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). Since courts will be incapable 
of solving potential disputes between contracting parties, the level of each party's investments is 
left out from the ex ante contract. Consequently, the agents play a non-cooperative game with 
respect  to  their  ex  ante  investments,  i.e.  each  agent  chooses  its  own  profit-maximizing 
investment, taking the investment of his production partner as given. The investment incentives 
of each party depend on the organizational form, i.e. whether both units are integrated or not. We 
assume that courts can verify and enforce the ex ante choice of the organizational structure. 
Timing. The timing of the non-cooperative game that we consider is summarized in figure 1. 
After  H  bears the fixed entry cost  E f  and draws productivity q , he decides whether to leave the 
industry immediately or to stay and produce. Once he enters the market, he chooses in  0 t  the 
organizational form, i.e. whether to integrate a component producer into the firm boundaries or to 
outsource manufacturing production to an independent supplier. Since the parties negotiate about 
all future contingencies on the spot in the game that we consider in this section, we call these two 
organizational options spot integration (SI ) and spot outsourcing (SO). Each headquarter thus 
offers a contract which stipulates the organizational form  { } SO SI k , Î . 
 
Figure 1: Timing of the non-cooperative game. 
The ensuing analysis is simplified by assuming that in  0 t  the headquarter also stipulates an up-
front transfer 
S T  that has to be paid by the component producer  M  for participation in the 
relationship.  In  fact,  combining  this  assumption  with  the  further  assumption  that  there  is  an 
infinitely  elastic  supply  of  component  suppliers  (whereas  the  number  of  headquarters  H   is 
strictly finite), there will be a competitve bidding process among suppliers which secures the firm 
their participation at least cost as in Antràs and Helpman (2004). The result of this competitive 
bidding process is that the expected profit of  M  from the relationship with the headquarter is 
driven to M ‘s ex-ante outside option which we normalize to zero.    11 
Once the cooperation between  H  and  M  is founded, both parties simultaneously choose their 
investment levels  k h  and  k m  in  1 t . When these specific investments are completed, their quantity 
is observable by both partners and by the courts.  
In  2 t , the parties get together to negotiate about the division of the surplus. In accordance with 
the Property Rights Theory of the firm, we assume that surplus sharing takes place according to 
generalized Nash-bargaining. Each party thus gets her outside option plus a share of the quasi 
rent (i.e. the revenue generated inside the relationship net of each party's outside option). Let 
(0,1) Î k b   denote the  headquarters'  share  that  is  stipulated  at  the negotiation  stage  2 t   under 
organizational mode  SO SI k , =  (hence  k b - 1  is the share that accrues to  M ). The revenue 
shares  k b  and  k b - 1  depend both on the exogenous bargaining weights  b  and  b - 1  of the 
headquarter and the supplier respectively as well as on the exogenous outside options that are 
available to the two parties under the two organizational forms. The revenue shares are thus also 
exogenous.  Specifically,  we  follow  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004)  in  imposing  the  following 
assumptions. Under spot outsourcing,  H  owns input  SO h  and  M  possesses the property rights 
for input  SO m . By assumption, both inputs are highly specific, so that their value outside the 
relationship is zero. Therefore, the Nash-bargaining delivers the headquarter an ex post payoff 
SO SO R R b b = 0) 0 ( 0 - - +  and the manufacturing producer an ex post payoff  SO R ) (1 b - .  H ‘s 
revenue share under spot outsourcing is thus determined solely by his bargaining power, i.e., 
b b = SO . Under spot integration,  M  is  H ‘s employee and therefore the headquarter possesses 
property rights for manufacturing inputs  SI m . While the outside option of the component supplier 
in this case is still zero, the outside option of the headquarter is now positive, as the latter can use 
both inputs in the production process. However, we assume that if the bargaining fails the final-
good producer can produce only a fraction  (0,1) Î d  of the output that could be produced with 
the  cooperation  of  the  supplier.
18  By  substituting  ) ( x d   for  x  in  the  revenue  function 
a a a m
- - 1 = L X x R , we get the outside option of the headquarter in case of spot integration,  SI R
a d . 
Hence,  H   gets  the  payoff  = - + - - + SI SI SI SI R R R R )] (1 [ = 0) ( b d b d b d
a a a
SI SIR b   and  the 
                                                 
18 This assumption follows Antràs and Helpman (2004). It accords with the fact that, during production, the 
component supplier M  typically accumulates some idiosyncratic know-how, which the headquarter is unable to 
appropriate in case that the bargain fails.   12 
supplier obtains the payoff  SI SI R ) (1 b - . To sum up, the headquarter obtains a larger share of the 
revenue under integration than under outsourcing  
  . = > ) (1 SO SI b b b d b b
a - + º   (10) 
In  3 t ,  headquarter  services  and  manufacturing  components are  (costlessly)  combined  to  final 
output according to technology in (4) and the  final  goods  are produced and sold.  In  4 t , the 
revenue is distributed according to the sharing rule that was agreed in the spot contract in  2 t . 
2.5.2  Investment decisions and profits 
This  one-shot  game  is  solved  through  backward  induction.  To  find  a  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium, we first consider the investment decisions of both parties. In  1 t , H  invests  k h  which 
maximizes  k k k h R - b , whereas M  provides  k m  that maximizes  k k k m R - - ) (1 b  where  k R  is the 
revenue that emerges under the organizational form  { } SO SI k , Î . The first-order conditions of 
these  maximization  problems  imply  the  best-response  functions  k k k R h ah b =   and 
k k k R m ) (1 ) (1 = h a b - - . Utilizing these in (5) yields revenue 
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It is apparent from comparing (7) and (11) that the revenue under incomplete contracs is smaller 
than in the first-best case. This reflects that 
* < h hk  and 
* < m mk  which immediately follows 
from  comparing  (6)  and  (12).  Intuitively,  in  the  absence  of  complete  contracts  each  party 
anticipates ex post to be held up by its cooperation partner and, therefore, underinvests ex ante. 
This hold-up problem is also reflected in a higher price charged by a firm with productivity q    13 
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k p   (13) 
where  1 > ) (1 ) 1/(
1 h h b b
- - k k  (for all  ) 1 , 0 ( , Î h bk ) is the cost factor that arises due to contractual 
incompleteness. Using (11) and (12) we can derive the pure profit under spot contract k  as: 




q p   (14) 
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k k k k k   (15) 
embraces all terms that include an organizational-specific index  } , { SO SI kÎ . Comparing (9) 
with (14) reveals that profits under spot contracting are lower than first-best profits, i.e.  * p p < k  
iff  ) (1 < a - Yk . This holds true indeed: 
Lemma 1. It holds true for all permissible parameter values that  ) (1 < a - Yk . 
Proof. See Appendix A. ■ 
The ex ante transfer 
S T  from  M  to  H  combined with the assumption that there is an infintitely 
elastic supply of component suppliers implies that the total surplus from the spot relationship 
accrues to the headquarter. A component supplier is left with zero net profits: 
  0. = )) (1 (1 ) (1 = 1 1
1
1 S










h a b b p   (16) 
2.5.3  Organizational choice 
Since  0 = Mk p ,  joint  pure  profits  under  either  spot  contract  } , { SO SI kÎ   accrue  to  the 
headquarter  H , i.e.  k Hk p p = . Thus, the headquarter chooses ex ante the organizational form  k  
which  maximizes  joint  pure  profits  given  by  (14)  and  (15)  and  it  thereby  also  implicitly 
determines the ex post revenue share  k b . We call the resulting profits third-best (TB):
19  
                                                 
19 We call these profits third-best from the point of view of producers to contrast this case with the hypothetical 
second-best case where the headquarter is freely able to choose the revenue share  (0,1)
* Î b  during ex post 
bargaining: the headquarter would thus select  * b  such that it achieves the highest possible profits under contractual 
incompleteness. It is a defining element of the Property Rights Theory of the firm that it takes the revenue shares 
} , { SO SI k b b b Î as exogenous and distinct. The hypothetical second-best solution serves as a useful reference point to 
identify whether spot integration or spot outsourcing are more profitable as Antràs and Helpman (2004) have shown. 
We provide a discussion of the second-best case in appendix B.   14 
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  (17) 
Since fixed costs are identical in both ownership structures, the make-or-buy decision reduces to 
a comparison of the operating profits,  k P . Let  ) (h S P  denote the ratio of operating profits under 
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S   (18) 
The relative attractiveness of spot integration, as measured by  ) (h S P , can be shown to increase 
in the headquarter intensity of production (see appendix C and figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Organizational choice in the spot game. 
Intuitively,  the  relative  importance  of  investments  in  headquarter  services  rises  in  h.  By 
integrating a supplier into the firm boundaries, the headquarter gets higher ex ante investment 
incentives. Moreover, it can be shown that there is a unique critical threshold  (0,1) ˆ Î S h  at which 
spot integration becomes more profitable than spot outsourcing. Hence, we have: 
Proposition  1.  Organizational  choice  under  spot  contracting.  There  exists  a  unique 
headquarter  intensity  (0,1) ˆ Î S h   such  that  if  S h h ˆ <   all  firms  will  outsource  manufacturing 
production,  whereas  if  S h h ˆ >   all  firms  will  integrate  the  suppliers.  In  industry  with  a 
headquarter intensity  S h ˆ  firms are indifferent between the two organizational forms. 
Proof. See Appendix C. ■   15 
3  General equilibrium in the spot game 
3.1  Equilibrium conditions and parameterization 
Having characterized the choices of firms after the productivity is drawn both in the benchmark 
case  with  complete  contracts  and  under  contractual  incompleteness,  we  now  move  to  the 
equilibrium in the modern sector. As in Melitz (2003), this equilibrium can be characterized by 
two conditions, a zero cutoff profit condition and a free entry condition.  
It should be noted at the outset that the general equilibrium of the economy follows immediately 
once the industry equilibrium in the modern sector is derived, as is well-known from the two-
sector models of the new trade theory (cf. Helpman and Krugman 1985) of which the present 
model is a variant. Equilibrium in the modern sector defines the resource use (labor use) of that 
sector. The remaining labor is used to produce the outside good. By Walras law it follows that the 
expenses on the aggregate consumption of the outside good and the modern good just match the 
wage income generated in this economy. 
All the results derived so far hold for any productivity distribution  ) (q G . However, both to 
accord with empirical findings and in order to obtain closed-form solutions we assume from now 
on that productivities  q  are drawn from a Pareto distribution with lower bound  b  and shape 
parameter  z :
20  
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q   (19) 
where  ) (q g  is the corresponding probability density function. We impose the assumptions  2 > z  
to ensure that the Pareto-distributed variable has a well-defined (finite) variance and the further 
assumption  1 > - s z  to obtain economically meaningful solutions (see appendix D).  
3.2  Equilibrium under perfectly enforceable contracts 
This section derives the equilibrium for the benchmark case of perfectly enforceable contracts. 
After paying the fixed entry costs  E f  and drawing its productivity  q , the headquarter decides 
whether to exit immediately or to start producing. It will start producing if the profits from doing 
so are non-negative. The zero cutoff profit condition (ZCPC*) defines the cutoff productivtity 
* q  
                                                 
20 The Pareto distribution has been extensively used in the literature on heterogeneous firms, see, e.g. Kortum 
(1997), Helpman et al. (2004, 2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).   16 
which solves  0 = ) , (
* X q p , i.e. the (endogenous) threshold level, from which on firms are active: 



















X X              (20) 
Headquarters will incur the fixed entry costs  E f  to participate in the productivity lottery, if the 
expected pure profits are at least equal to  E f . The free entry condition (FEC*) commands: 
(FEC*)  , = ) ( ) , (
*
*
E f dG X q q p
q∫
¥
  (21) 
where 
* p  and 
* q  are given by (9) and (20), respectively. We show in appendix D that (21) can 
be solved for the aggregate consumption index  * X  in the first-best case and that 
* q  is then 
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All other endogenous variables are then easily obtained. The average productivity of active firms, 
* ~




* > 1 / =
~
q q s q s - + - z z   as  we  show  in 
appendix  D.  The  price  level  follows  from  using 
* X   in 
1 =
- X P m .  This  gives  us: 





m a a q
-
- - - f L P  Following Melitz (2003), the CES price index can be rewritten 














- N p N P . Using 
* P  this can be 
solved  out  for  the  mass  of  manufacturing  firms  (varieties)  in  the  market, 
( ) [ ] ). (1 / 1 =
* a m s - + - L fz z N   We  complete  the  characterization  of  equilibrium  in  this 
benchmark case with an expression for welfare:  
1) ln ( ln 1 =
* * - + - m m m P V                (23) 
where the price level 
* P  is as characterized before. 
3.3  Equilibrium under contractual incompleteness 
The equilibrium under contractual incompleteness can be derived by analogy to the previous   17 
section. The zero cutoff profit condition in this third-best case (ZCPC
TB) requires  0 = ) , ( X
TB
k q p  
and implies the cutoff productivity under spot contracting: 
(ZCPC
















TB   (24) 
All firms with productivities exceeding this threshold start to produce. Comparing (20) and (24) 
reveals that, for any given level of aggregate consumption say  X ,  ( ) X X
TB * ) ( q q >  as long as 
) (1 < a - Yk , which holds true according to Lemma 1. Hence, under contractual incompleteness 
a  higher  productivity  is  needed  in  order  to  start  producing.  The  free  entry  condition  under 
contractual incompleteness (FEC
TB) requires:  
(FEC
TB)  , = ) ( ) , ( E
TB
k f dG X
TB q q p
q ∫
¥
  (25) 
where 
TB
k p  and 
TB q  are given by (17) and (24), respectively. Following the approach sketched in 




















































  (26) 
Two important insights merit to be mentioned here. First, Lemma 1 implies that the aggregate 
consumption index under contractual incompleteness is lower than in the benchmark. Second, the 
cutoff productivity in the third-best case equals the threshold productivity in the first-best case 
and,  hence,  is  not  influenced  by  contractual  incompleteness.  Consequently,  the  average 





TB .  Nevertheless,  due  to  the  additional  cost  factor 
associated  with  incomplete  contracting  (see  eq.  (13)),  the  average  price  of  the  monopolistic 
producers,  h h b b a q
q - -










k p , is higher as compared to the benchmark. This 
gets also reflected in a higher CES price index,  [ ]
*
1
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mass  of  firms,  [ ] ( ) [ ]
* 1 ) /( 1 = )
~






k > × + - -
-
g m s q a
a
  (where 
a h b h b a g - > - - + - º 1 )] )(1 (1 [ 1 k k k ). The higher price level immediately entails that welfare 




k P V   (27)   18 
is lower compared to the benchmark case with complete contracts. We have thus proven: 
Proposition  2.  Comparision  of  equilibria.  Comparing  the  equilibrium  with  incomplete 
contracts  with  the  equilibrium  under  perfectly  enforceable  contracts  yields:  * X X
TB
k < , 
* q q =
TB ,  * p p
TB
k >  and  * P P
TB
k > . Welfare is lower under incomplete contracts,  * V V
TB
k < . ■ 
4  Relational contracting 
4.1  Assumptions 
Set-up. Business cooperations involving relationship-specific investments are the ones where we 
would expect long-term relationships to prevail. We now embed the one-shot game of section 2.5 
into a repeated game with infinitely lived agents. We build on Baker et al. (2002) and assume that 
firms can either enter a relational agreement once and forever or negotiate in each period of the 
repeated game on the spot. This section introduces our assumptions concerning the relational 
game. In the subsequent sections we analyze the tradeoff between spot and relational contracting. 
Short-  and  long-term  orientation.  We  assume  heterogeneity  of  firms  with  respect  to  time 
preference  [ ] 1 , e Î r  where e  is an arbitrary small positive number.
21 To simplify the notation, we 
omit the firm-index i right away. Headquarters with high  r strongly discount future profits and, 
hence,  are  more  short-term  oriented  than  headquarters  with  small  r.  In  analogy  to  the 
productivity lottery (cf. section 2.3) where firms draw q  from  ) (q G , we assume that the rates of 
time preference  r are drawn from an ex ante known distribution function  ) (r G , after the fixed 
cost of entry are payed. For simplicity it is assumed that these two draws are independent. 
Timing. The timing of the repeated game is as follows (see figure 3). Upon paying the fixed cost 
of entry, the firm headquarter draws his productivity q  and time preference r which then prevail 
in perpetuity. He then decides whether to leave the industry immediately or to start production 
which involves per-period fixed production costs  H M f f f + = . In the latter case, the headquarter 
seeks a supplier to cooperate with in perpetuity, i.e. in  ¥ = ,..., 0 t . Each period  t consists of 
subperiods  4 0,...,t t  in which the successive stages needed to produce the final good take place. 
Headquarters that start production make two decisions in subperiod  0 t . First, they decide whether 
to integrate a component supplier or to source out component production. In either case, both 
                                                 
21 We exclude the case  0 = r  that implicates infinitely long-term oriented firms.   19 
parties stipulate the ownership structure in the ex ante (explicit) contract. Second, headquarters 
decide whether to play the spot game infinitely (S ) or to engage in relational contracting ( R). In 
the  former  case,  the  upper  path  of  figure  3  applies  which  indicates  that  the  stages  in  the 
subperiods are as in the one-shot game (cf. figure 1). In the latter case the headquarter offers a 
relational obligation to undertake first-best efficient investment (cf. the lower path in figure 3). In 
order  to  distinguish  this  game  from  the  spot  game  described  in  section  2.5,  we  define  the 
organizational modes under relational contracting as  RO RI, = k , i.e. relational integration and 
relational outsourcing, respectively.
22 In the case of relational contracting we impose a specific 
informational environment and we assume that a transfer-bonus system applies whose rationale 
we explain in the next paragraph. The component supplier pays the per-period upfront transfer 
R T  in order to participate in the relational cooperation in  0 t . In  1 t  the headquarter commits to 
pay a bonus  B  in  4 t  to the supplier if the latter provides first-best efficient investments. If both 
parties stick to the relational agreement, the first-best investments (
* *,m h ) as specified in (6) are 
made in  2 t , the first-best output (
* x ) is produced and sold in  3 t  and the headquater pays a part B 
of the first-best revenue 
* R  to the supplier in  4 t . If both parties honor the contract in period 
0 = t ,  the  implicit  agreement  described  above  will  prevail  for  the  rest  of  the  game  (i.e.,  in 
¥ = ,..., 1 t ). The headquarter's choice of the governance mode (spot vs. relational) is analyzed in 
section 4.5. 
 
Figure 3: Timing in the repeated game. 
Informational environment, upfront transfer and ex post bonus. To gain simplicity in the 
one-shot  game  of  section  2  we  have  employed  the  idea  of  an  up-front  transfer 
S T   and  the 
                                                 
22 As these agreements are implicitly made, there is no difference between a spot and a relational contract from a 
legal perspective. Put differently, if the contracting parties stipulate, for instance, outsourcing as ownership structure, 
the courts cannot verify whether the cooperation proceeds via the spot or the relational governance regime.   20 
assumption of an infinitely elastic supply of component-suppliers. A competitive bidding process 
ensured that the  M ’s were driven to their outside option and that all joint pure (spot) profits 
accrued to the headquarters. We maintain these assumptions for the upper path of figure 3 which 
portrays spot contracting.  In order to gain similar simplicity under relational contracting, we 
impose the following assumptions in the repeated game. We assume that, after the productivity 
and  the  rate  of  time  preference  are  drawn  by  the  headquarters  H,  both  become  common 
knowledge to the component suppliers M.
23 Under relational contracting, headquarters offer a 
relational obligation in which they implicitely commit to undertake first-best efficient investment. 
Component suppliers applying for these cooperations similarly implicitly promise to provide their 
optimal investment. However, as both parties’ investments are made simultanously and implicit 
commitments can not be verified by the courts, the M’s are always tempted to underinvest ex ante 
and, by holding up the cooperative party, thus to obtain one-shot deviation profits ex post. To rule 
out that such deviation is profitable for suppliers and in order to gain the simplicity of the one-
shot game, we assume that an upfront transfer 
R T  needs to be paid by the suppliers in order to 
participate in the relational cooperation (R). Since the pool of potential suppliers is strictly larger 
than the mass of headquarters, the former will overbid each other with respect to this upfront 
payment 
R T   until  M’s  ex  post  deviation  profits  are  driven  to  their  ex-ante  outside  option 
(normalized to zero). Bearing in mind that the M’s are tempted to renege once the relational 
cooperation has been established, H implicitely commits to pay ex post a bonus B to M, if the 
latter does not renege (i.e., provides the first-best investment). This bonus pays back the upfront 
payment and compensates M’s fixed and variable effort at his opportunity cost ( 1 = w ).
24 
Trigger strategies. The relational contract is implicit, so each party may renege on it. More 
specifically, M defects (D) on the implicit agreement by providing a suboptimal investment level 
* m m
D < k ,  while  H  behaves  cooperatively  (i.e.,  invests 
* h ).  Analogously,  H  can  cheat  the 
cooperative  party  M  (that  invests 
* m )  by  delivering 
* h h
D < k   and  then  refusing  to  pay  the 
                                                 
23 The assumption that the time preference rate r is perfectly observable by component suppliers, as strong as it might 
appear, is not very restrictive, in fact. Alternatively, one could assume that the M’s do not know the idiosyncratic 
time preference rates of the H’s but that they possess knowledge about the distribution of r ‘s in the economy. 
Utilizing this assumption makes the model more cumbersome to solve without altering the main results. 
24 The payment of the bonus is also in the best interest of headquarters: if they do not pay out the bonus after the 
supplier has provided the first-best investment, the cooperation is destroyed for all future periods. However, it is easy 
to show that if headquarters were ever tempted not to live up to their promises, they would do so by cheating in the 
investment. Hence, if from the point of view of headquarters a relational contract exists which dominates an infinite 
succession of spot contracts, then paying the bonus is in the best interest of headquarters to maintain the relational   21 
promised bonus B. If either party deviates from the implicit agreement, the relational contract is 
broken and the resulting surplus in this period is shared via generalized Nash-bargaining. For 
simplicity, we assume that, for a given ownership structure, parties’ bargaining shares in this 
period  correspond  to  those  under  spot  contracting  (i.e, SI RI b b =   and  SO RO b b = ).
25  Once  a 
relational agreement is broken, the party who did not renege refuses to enter into a new relational 
contract with the opportunistic party. Furthermore, we assume that neither of the existing partners 
can enter into a new relational agreement with some third party.
26 Therefore, the two parties live 
forever under spot governance (as specified in section 2.5) in case of a failure of a relational 
agreement.  Following  Baker  et  al.  (2002),  we  allow  the  headquarters  to  choose  anew  the 
ownership form in the spot contract prevailing in all subsequent periods  ¥ 1,..., = t .  
Table 1 illustrates the per period pure profits and the respective investments of both parties under 




k p  denotes the payoff of party H (lower index) under 
organizational  form  RO RI, = k   if  this  party  (upper  index)  defected  upon  the  relational 
agreement.  The  defection  payoff  of  party  M   is  defined  analogously.  Both  parties’  one-shot 
deviation profits are derived in the folowing section.  
 
Table  1: Trigger strategy in the repeated game. 
                                                                                                                                                              
contract. We analyze this incentive compatibility constraint below. 
25 The analysis can be just as well conducted under the assumptions  SI RI b b ¹  and  SO RO b b ¹ . 
26 This can be motivated by the assumption that all existing cooperations are registered in a Commercial Registry, 
which is common knowledge for all market participants. However, neither the terms of the relational contract nor the 
identity of the reneging party can be detected by a third person. By assuming that a party who was cheated upon in 
the relational contract cannot credibly signalize her cooperative behavior to third parties, no third party will have an 
incentive to enter into a new relational agreement with a party who just contracted out.   22 
4.2  Profits on the deviation path 
Consider first the case where  M  defects on the relational contract whilst  H  provides the first-
best investment 
* h . This breaks the contract and leads to a division of the surplus in this period 
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Comparing (6), (12) and (28) it is apparent that 
* < < m m m
D
k k  for all  ) 1 , 0 ( , , Î = k b b h a k . On 
the deviation path M  underinvests in period 0 relative to the first-best case, but still invests more 
than  in  the  third-best  case.
27  Hence,  we  have  the  following  gradation  of  revenues: 
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The competitive bidding process on the part of suppliers that we described above implies that the 
transfer 
R T  is chosen such that M ’s one-shot pure profits are driven to zero,  0 =
|M D
Mk p . When the 
relational contract is broken in  0 = t  the co-operation partners negotiate in all subsequent periods 
¥ 1,..., = t  on the spot and the supplier obtains zero profits  0 =
TB
Mk p  (see (16)). Hence, pure 
profits of component suppliers on the entire deviation path are equal to zero. 
Consider now  H 's pure profits on the deviation path supposing that M sticks to the relational 
agreement  and  provides  the  first  best  investment 
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The one-shot pure profit of party  H  is then: 
                                                 
27 This results from the complementarity of investments and the fact that H invests more than in the third-best case.   23 
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where the last transformation uses 
R T  from (29). In view of the fact that  0 =
TB
Mk p  as a result of 
the transfer 




k k p p º . The latter expresses that the one-shot pure deviation profit of  H  comprises the joint 
one-shot pure deviation profit of the headquarter and the supplier. Hence, 
D
k p  expresses both 
parties’ temptation to deviate.  
The following Lemma establishes that if  M  sticks to the relational contract (i.e., provides 
* m ), 
H’s one shot pure profits from deviation are higher than his profits in the first-best case (see (9)). 
Lemma 2. 
* p pk >
D  for all  (0,1) , , Î k b h a . 
Proof. See Appendix E. ■ 
Intuitively, by demanding the ex ante transfer 
R T  and refusing to pay the ex post bonus B,  H  
can collect exorbitant profits. However, these profits can be reaped only in  0 = t . The spot game 
is then played in all subsequent periods implying headquarter’s profits 





4.3  Incentive compatibility constraint 
We now analyze the condition under which relational contracts emerge. Note first that by the 
construction of the transfer-bonus system, a component supplier is not worse off by providing the 
first-best investment 
* m  than by defecting (i.e. by supplying 
* m m
D < k  in period 0). The bonus is 
implicitly defined by  0 ) , (
* * * * = - - - =
R
M M T f m B m h p . We assume that the supplier prefers 
cooperation  to  defection  in  case  that  both  actions  yield  the  same  reward 
( 0 ) , ( ) , (
* | * * * = =
D M D
M M m h m h k k p p ).  If both parties behave cooperatively, the headquarter’s pure 
profits are given by  B T f h m h R m h
R
H H - + - - =
* * * * * * ) , ( ) , ( p . Using 
R
M T f m B + + =
* , these 
profits reduce to the joint pure profits 
* p  as in (9). Given the trigger strategy specified in Table 1 
and  bearing  in  mind  that  0
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ICC   (32) 
As long as this ICC holds, there exists a bonus B which induces the first-best investment of both 
parties in perpetuity under organizational form  k . Following Baker et al. (2002: 52), we can 
interpret the left-hand side of (32) as the present value of the net total surplus (i.e. the total 
surplus from continuing the relationship (i.e. 
* p ), less the best fallback if either party should 




SO p p ). The right-hand side is the maximum reneging temptation (MRT ) 
under relational contract  k , i.e., the joint one-shot reneging incentives less joint profits under 
cooperation.  Notice  that  both  relational  ownership  forms  ( RO RI, )  can  induce  the  same 
investments (
* *,m h ) and deliver the headquarter the same surplus 
* p , iff the ICC is satisfied in 
either case. We show in the following that the temptation to renege on a relational agreement 
differs under the two organizational forms, however. 
4.4  Make-or-buy decision in the relational game 
To ensure that the ICC (32) is fulfilled, the headquarter has to minimize the maximum reneging 
temptation  MRT , i.e. the right hand side of (32). This is achieved by choosing the governance 














RI R P P º P / ) (h  to be the ratio 
of operating deviation profits under relational integration to those under relational outsourcing. 
Using (31) and focussing on the operating profits yields: 
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R   (33) 
Appendix  G  shows  that  ) ( ' h R P   is  a  polynomial  of  degree  2,  hence  the  slope  of  ) (h R P   is 
ambiguous. However, we prove analytically that if the headquarter intensity is low enough (e.g. 
for  0 = h ) the reneging temptation is lower under relational outsourcing compared to relational 
integration (i.e.  1 > (0) R P ), whereas if the headquarter intensity is high enough the converse 
holds (i.e.  1 < (1) R P ). Furthermore,  0 < ) ( ' h R P  around  1 = ) (h R P . Hence we have: 
                                                 
28 As in the spot game, if the headquarter could freely choose the revenue share in the bargain ex post, the MRT 
would be always minimized and the choice of organizational form  RO RI, = k  would not matter. See appendix F.   25 
Proposition 3.  Organizational choices  under  relational  contracting.  There  exists a unique 
headquarter  intensity  (0,1) ˆ Î R h   such  that  in  industries  with  R h h ˆ <   headquarters  prefer 
relational outsourcing to relational integration (i.e.  1 > ) (h R P ), while in industries with  R h h ˆ >  
headquarters  prefer  relational  integration  to  relational  outsourcing  (i.e.  1 < ) (h R P ).  In 
industries  with  headquarter  intensity  R h h ˆ =   firms  are  indifferent  between  these  two 
organizational forms. 
Proof. See Appendix G. ■ 
 
Figure 4: Organizational choice under relational contracting. 
One possible run of  ) (h R P  is depicted in figure 4. Intuitively,  M 's investments in relational 
contracts are highest in industries with small headquarter intensity. Under these circumstances  H  
has the greatest incentive to cheat and reap a high one-shot deviation payoff. By leaving the 
property rights for components to the supplier (i.e. by strengthening the other party’s bargaining 
position if the relational contract is broken), the headquarter minimizes his own incentives to 
renege and thereby signalizes his willingness to cooperate. Conversely, when h gets larger,  M 's 
one-shot deviation incentives increase. For high enough headquarter intensity it becomes optimal 
to integrate the supplier into the firm boundaries to minimize the joint deviation incentives. 
This section pursued the question whether relational integration or outsourcing minimizes the 
MRT  in the repeated game. However, the organizational form k  that minimizes (31) does not 
necessarily render the ICC self-enforcing. Through its left-hand side, the ICC crucially depends   26 
on the firm-specific time preference rate  r. The next section seeks the organizational form that 
ensures the first-best outcome for the greatest range of discount factors.  
4.5  Spot vs. relational contracting 
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k r   (34) 
where  r  denotes the cutoff rate of time preference which satisfies the ICC with equality.
30 If 
r r <  a headquarter can achieve the first-best outcome by means of relational contracting under 
organizational  form  k .  Otherwise,  the  parties  negotiate  in  each  period  on  the  spot  under 
organizational form k . The operators  {} × k max  and  {} × k min  denote the subgame perfect equilibria 
of the spot and relational game respectively. 
Two important results are worth mentioning in view of (34). First, the feasibility of relational 
contracting does not depend on the firm-specific productivity q , but on the headquarter’s time 
preference rate  r . Hence, the long-term orientation of the headquarters affects their ability to 
conclude a relational agreement with suppliers and, thus, to achieve first-best rather than third-
best profits. Therefore, in a given industry there may exist firms which differ in their profitability 
despite using the identical production technology q . Second, since the governance regime (be it 
spot or relational contracting) stipulated in period 0 is a subgame perfect equilibrium in each 
stage of the repeated game, the parties live forever under the regime agreed upon in the very first 
period.  Consequently,  differences  in  profitability  between  firms  with  different  rates  of  time 
preference persist over time. It thus follows: 
Proposition 4. Persistent performance differences between seemingly similar enterprises. 
Persistent  performance  differences  between  seemingly  similar  enterprises  arise  due  to  the 
heterogeneity of headquarters with respect to their rate of time preference. 
                                                 
29Notice, the aggregate consumption index  X  is one of the variables that cancel out from the ICC. Intuitively,  X  is 
exogenous from the viewpoint of a single firm and thus independent of its organizational structure. 
30 Since 
TB
k p p >
*  (Lemma 1) and 
* p pk >
D  (Lemma 2), r  is always positive. However, since the inequality 
TB
k
D p p p pk - > -
* *  is violated for some parameter values, the cutoff rate of time preference implied by (34) may as 
well lie above 1. We return to this issue below.   27 
Proof. This follows immediately from equation (34) and our discussion above. ■ 
Numerical example. A firm’s choice of the organizational mode is completely characterized by 
the parameters  (0,1) , , , Î k b b h a k  and by the firm-specific rate of time preference r.  In  this 
section we provide an exemplary analysis of the make-or-buy decision for an industry with the 
following parameter values:  0.5 = = RO SO b b ,  0.9 = = RI SI b b  and  0.9 = a . Substituting these 
values into  1 = ) (h S P  from (18) and solving for  S h ˆ  yields the threshold headquarter intensity 
0.75 ˆ » S h .
31  Hence,  in  industries  with  headquarter  intensity  0.75 < h   firms  choose  spot 
outsourcing while in industries with  0.75 > h  spot integration is the chosen organizational form. 
Analogously, by substituting the parameter values into  1 = ) (h R P  from (33), one numerically 
obtains  the  cutoff  0.67 ˆ » R h .  This  threshold  separates  relational  outsourcing  and  integration. 
Figure 5 depicts these cutoffs and the corresponding organizational modes.
32  
 
Figure  5: Cutoffs  S h ˆ  and  R h ˆ  for  1/2 = = RO SO b b ,  0.9 = = RI SI b b  and  0.9 = a . 
Next, we can use this information in (34) to derive the cutoff rate of time preference  r  that pins 
down the choice between spot and relational governance.
33 Numerical simulations are depicted in 
figure  6  by  the  curve  that  separates  spot  from  relational  contracting.  For  each  headquarter 
intensity  h  there exists a unique  r  such that headquarters with  r r <  conclude a relational 
agreement with suppliers, whereas firms with  r r >  operate under spot contracting.
34  
In the last step we derive the cutoff time preference rate  r ~  for which the ex ante choice of the 
organizational mode in the relational contract is irrelevant, i.e. we seek  r ~  such that firms with 
r r ~ <  achieve the first-best outcome both under relational outsourcing and relational integration. 
Recall that for  ) ˆ , 0 ( R h h Î  (for  ) 1 , ˆ ( R h h Î ) relational outsourcing (relational integration) is the 
                                                 
31 We performed these calculations in MAPLE. The worksheets are provided upon request. 
32The ordering 
S R h h ˆ < ˆ  is not robust. If  k b b = k  is low enough the reverse ordering obtains. 
33 Remembering the results depicted in figure 5, we substitute for  } , { k b bk  the assumed values  {0.5,0.5} = } , { RO SO b b  in 
the interval  (0,0.67) Î h ;  {0.5,0.9} = } , { RI SO b b  in the range  ) (0.67,0.75 Î h , and  {0.9,0.9} = } , { RI SI b b  in the range  (0.75,1) Î h . 
34Notice from figure 5 that some combinations of industry-specific parameter values may yield  1 > r . In this case,   28 
dominant organizational form in the sense that it minimizes the MRT. The following thought 
experiment  explores  whether  the  ICC  (34)  still  holds  if  a  dominated  instead  of  a  dominant 
organizational form is chosen in a relational contract.
35 In fact, as shown in figure 6, there exists a 
range of time preferences rates (depicted by the area RO&RI) which implies cooperative behavior 
independent of the ex ante choice of the organizational mode. Put differently, in a particular 




Figure 6: Dominant organizational forms for  1/2 = = RO SO b b ,  0.9 = = RI SI b b  and  0.9 = a . 
Summing up the results of this section we have:  
Proposition 5. Coexistence of organizational modes. Our model implies the coexistence of 
organizational modes in equilibrium. First, for a given headquarter intensity  h there do exist 
multiple equilibria in the sense that if the rate of time preference is low enough, both (relational) 
outsourcing and (relational) integration are viable. Second, if we allow the headquarter intensities 
to vary (say in a multi-industry version of our model), our model explains all four types of 
organizational modes.  
Proof. This follows immediately from the discussion above. ■ 
                                                                                                                                                              
all firms in the particual industry play relational contracting independently of firm-specific discount factors r . 
35  More  specifically,  we  utilize  {0.5,0.9} = } , { RI SO b b in  the  interval  (0,0.67) Î h ; {0.5,0.5} = } , { RO SO b b   in  the  range 
) (0.67,0.75 Î h , and  {0.9,0.9} = } , { RO SI b b  in the range  (0.75,1) Î h . 
36 For instance, given the parameters underlying figure 6, possible organizational forms existing in the industry with 
headquarter intensity  3 . 0 = h  are SO, RO, RI.   29 
The  seminal  analysis  by  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004)  explains  the  coexistence  of  ownership 
modes on the industry level by assuming exogenous differences in fixed costs between different 
organizational  forms.  We  drop  this  ad  hoc  assumption  which,  arguably,  sits  somewhat 
uncomfortably with the concept of a ‘unified theory of the firm’ envisioned by Grossman and 
Hart (1986) which seeks to derive both costs and benefits of organizational forms endogenously. 
Instead we provide an explanation for the coexistence of organizational modes which builds on 
the idea of relational contracting and in which the rate of time preferences plays a crucial role, 
thereby providing a further step towards such a ‘unified theory’. 
4.6  Equilibrium in the repeated game 
Free entry condition. Let 
*
0






















 denote the present value of the 
profit flow under relational contracting with  * p  as given in (9). These profits are achievable if 
the firm-specific time preference  r lies below the threshold  r  defined in (34). While the choice 
of the governance mode does not depend on q , a firm needs to be sufficiently productive in order 
to cover the fixed production cost to remain in the market. Hence, only such firms survive under 
relational  contracting  whose  productivity  level  is  above  the  cutoff 
* q   implied  by  (20). 





























  represent  the present value  of  the 
profit flow under spot contracting where 
TB
k p  is given by (17). These profits can be obtained if 
r r >  and they are positive if 
TB q q > , where the threshold productivity in the third-best case is 
determined by (24). Free entry ensures that the expected pure profits of a potential headquarter 
equal the fixed cost of entry,  E f . Thus, the free entry condition in the repeated (rep) game can be 
expressed as:  
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General equilibrium. The general equilibrium in this repeated game is completely characterized 
by the zero cutoff profit conditions (ZCPC*) and (ZCPC
TB) given in (20) and (24), respectively, 
the incentive compatibility constraint (34) and the free entry condition (35). The equilibrium can 
be solved out analytically by assuming specific parameterizations of the distribution functions   30 
) (q G  and  ) (r G . While we maintain the assumption that the technology parameter is Pareto-
distributed, we assume that the rate of time preference can take on only two values,  r rlow <  and 
r rhigh >   with  respective  probabilities  l   and  ) (1 l - .
37  Following  the  approach  sketched  in 
Appendix D, we can solve out (35) for the net present value of the aggregate consumption index:  
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) (1 l .  
) (l W  can be interpreted as a measure of the efficiency of the economy in the face of contractual 
incompleteness. The following lemma can be established: 
Lemma 3.  0 ) ( ' > W l . 
Proof. Follows immediately from combining Lemma 1 with the fact that  high low r r < . ■ 
Moreover, the higher is the share l  of firms acting under relational governance, the less severe is 
the underinvestment on the firm level and the higher is the aggregate manufacturing output. The 
inspection of  ) (l
rep X  is particularly instructive for the two extreme cases  1 = l  and  0 = l . In 
the former case, (36) simplifies to 
* / 1 ) / ) 1 (( = (1) X r r X
z
low low
rep × + , where 
* X  is the (per-period) 
first-best aggregate output from (22) and 
z
low low r r
/ 1 ) / ) 1 (( +  denotes the effective discount factor. 





rep X r r X × +
/ 1 ) / ) 1 (( = (0) , where 
TB
k X  is the third-
best aggregate index given by (26). In the general case where  (0,1) Î l ,  ) (l
rep X  is a convex 
combination  of these  extreme  cases. Plugging  (36)  into  (20)  and  (24)  yields  the  equilibrium 
productivity cutoffs in the repeated game for firms engaged in relational and spot contracting, 
respectively, 


















  (37) 
where 
* q  is given by (22). A comparison of both productivity cutoffs yields: 
                                                 
37 The focus on two values of r  suffices for our purposes. However, the results can easily be replicated for general   31 
Proposition  6.  Interaction  of  technology  and  organizational  capabilities  of  the  firms.  In 
general equilibrium the minumum productivity cutoff 
rep
S q  necessary for the survival of firms 
governed by spot contracting is higher than the minumum productivity cutoff 
rep
R q  required for 
survival of firms governed by relational contracting. 
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 1. ■ 
This proposition implies that short-sighted (spot) firms need to be more technologically versed 
than the more efficiently organized long-term oriented ones in order to be able to compete with 
the latter. As shown in Appendix H, we can express the average productivity in the repeated 
















































It can be easily shown that  0 ) ( ' > l K  for all  (0,1) , , Î k b h a . Hence, by Lemma 3, the average 
productivity in the repeated game,  ) (
~
l q
rep  is increasing in the share  l  of firms with low time 
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( K z z p z rep  is decreasing in  l . The price index in 
the  repeated  game,  ( ) z rep f L P
1 1
1 * ) ( / ) ( = ) (
- -
- - W × l m a q l a
a
  is  lower  when  l   is  higher.  The 
equilibrium  mass  of  firms,  [ ] ( ) [ ]
1 1 ) ( ) /( 1 )
~
( / ) ( = ) (
- -
-
× × + - = l m s q l l a
a
K L fz z p P N
rep rep rep  
decreases in the share of headquarters with time preference rate  r rlow < . The expression for 
welfare  
  1) ln ( ) ( ln 1 = ) ( - + - m m l m l
rep rep P V   (38) 
finalizes the characterization of the equilibrium in the repeated game. 
4.7  Country differences with respect to the distribution of the time preference rate 
We now turn to country differences with respect to the distribution of the time preference rate. 
We obtain: 
Proposition 7. Country differences with respect to the distribution of the time preference 
                                                                                                                                                              
distributions of r . We provide the solution where both  ) (q G  and  ) (r G  are Pareto-distributed on request.    32 
rate. Suppose country 1 has a higher share of firms (headquarters) with low time preference, as 
compared to country 2, i.e.  2 1 l l > . Then country 1 exhibits a higher aggregate consumption 
index 
rep X , a lower price level 
rep P  and higher welfare 
rep V  than country 2. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 3. ■ 
Intuitively, with  2 1 > l l ,  compared  to  country  2,  country  1  has  a  higher  share  of  long-term 
oriented headquarters (exhibiting a time preference rate  r rlow < ) that enter a (first-best) efficient 
relational contract with suppliers. As a consequence, consumers in country 1 face a lower price 
level and have a higher welfare than consumers in country 2. 
5  Concluding comments 
This paper brings the notion of relational contracting, as formalized in a repeated game by Baker 
et al. (2002), into a tractable variant of the seminal models developed by Antràs (2003) and 
Antràs and Helpman (2004) to reconcile two empirical findings. First, the performance of firms is 
strongly affected by their capacity to solve organizational questions effectively and this capacity 
is  apparently  strongly  related  to  their  ability  to  maintain  informal  long-term  relationships. 
Second, countries that are better at maintaining unwritten agreements and where interactions are 
more strongly guided by a sense of trust fare better in terms of economic welfare than others. Our 
micro-founded explanation shows how the trust that prevails in an economy gets transmitted into 
higher  economic  well-being  and  thereby  highlights  the  role  of  managers  with  low  time 
preference. 
We also show that in our full general equilibrium model the basic make-or buy decision is similar 
under  relational  contracting  as  under  spot  contracting:  if  the  headquarter  intensity  exceeds  a 
certain threshold, headquarters prefer relational integration to relational outsourcing whereas the 
opposite  holds  below  this  threshold.  Furthermore  we  show  that:  headquarters  with  low  time 
preference  are  able  to  reap  the  fruits  of  relational  contracts  whereas  those  with  high  time 
preference are stuck with spot contracts, irrespective of their productivity status. Further, we are 
able  to  endogenously  explain  the  coexistence  of  organizational  modes  –  integration  and 
outsourcing both in spot and relational firms. Hence, we also contribute a further step towards a 
‘unified theory of the firm’ which seeks to derive both costs and benefits of organizational forms 
endogenously as envisioned by Grossman and Hart (1986).   33 
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Appendices 
A  Proof of Lemma 1 
Lemma 1 ( ) (1 < a - Yk ) holds if and only if  1 < a y + Y º k k . Using (15),  k y  is given by  
  ( ) . )] )(1 (1 [ 1 ) (1 = ) ( 1
) (1




+ - - + - - -
-
-
k k k k k  
By simple differentiation of this function with respect to h it follows that  0 ) ( ¤ h y¢  iff  














£   (39) 
where  0 > ))) )(1 (1 ( (1 h b h b a g - - + - º k k k  for all  (0,1) , , Î h b a k , and  0 ) ( ¤ h g¢  if  1/2 £ k b . The 
following properties result from the inspection of inequality (39): 
    (i)  If  1/2 < k b , then  0 < ) (h y¢ ,  [0,1] , Î " a h .  
    (ii)  If  1/2 > k b , then  0 > ) (h y¢ ,  [0,1] , Î " a h .  
    (iii)  If  1/2 = k b , then  0 = ) (h y¢ ,  [0,1] , Î " a h .  
Using  these  properties,  the  sufficient  conditions  for  1 < k y   to  hold  simplify  to  1 < (0) y   for 
(0,1/2) Î k b ;  1 < (1) y  for  (1/2,1) Î k b , and  1 < ) (h y  for  1/2. = k b  It can be easily verified that 
these conditions hold for all  (0,1) , Î h a . This implies  ) (1 < a - Yk . 
 
B  Discussion of the second-best case in the spot game 
If a headquarter could freely choose his revenue share in the spot game, he would choose the 
second-best revenue share  ) (








- + - - - - +
h
a ah ah h h a ah h
h bS   (40) 
In order to show that 
*
S b  is strictly increasing in h , we simplify the first derivative of (40) with 
respect to h to get:   
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* h bS  holds if and only if  0 > ) 1 )( )(1 (1 ) (1
2
1
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
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 - + - - - - - º F a ah ah h h h ah a . The sign 
                                                 
38The second root of (14) is for all  (0,1) , Î h a  outside the assumed range of  (0,1)
* Î S b .    37 
of the first derivative of the latter function with respect to a  
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F¢  
is positive if and only if  0 > ) (a F . Suppose this is not true and  0 < ) (a F . If the latter is true, 
then it must be that  (0) < (1) F F . However, it can be easily shown that  0 > (0) > (1) F F . This 
leads to a contradiction. It thus follows that  0 > ) (a F  and, therefore,  0 > ) ( '
* h bS . 
Figure 7 plots  ) (
* h bS  against h for a given value of a  (ignore all other information in this figure 
until further notice). The intuition behind a positive slope of  ) (
* h bS  stems from the Property 
Rights Theory of the firm along the lines of Grossman and Hart (1986). The higher is the relative 
importance of headquarter services in production (i.e., the higher is h), the greater should be the 
headquarter’s share of revenues in order to incentivize the ex ante investment of this party. More 
specifically,  when  headquarters  get  a  share  ) (
* h bS   of  the  ex  post  surplus,  the  joint 
underinvestment is minimized and, thus, (second-best) joint profits are maximized. 
   
Figure  7: Bargaining shares and headquarter intensity 
However, as mentioned in the main text, we assume that the contracting parties can not freely 
choose their revenue shares at the negotiation stage. Since bargaining weights and outside options 
are determined exogenously on the industry level, both parties’ revenue shares are exogenous as 
well. For simplicity it is assumed that headquarters’ shares of revenue,  k b  are independent of the 
headquarter intensity of the industry. These are indicated as straight lines  SI b  and  SO b  in figure   38 
7. By ex-ante choosing the organizational form  SO SI k , = , the headquarter implicitly chooses a 
third-best bargaining share  k b  which comes closest to the second-best share derived in (40). 
 
C  Proof of Proposition 1 
In the first step of the proof we analyze the corner solutions of  ) (h S P . Using equation (18), we 
can establish  
  1. >
1
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The  first  inequality  follows  from  SO SI b b >   and  the  fact  that 
) /(1 ) ))(1 (1 (1
a a a
- - - - x x   is  a 
decreasing function of  x for all  (0,1) Î x  and  (0,1) Î a . Analogously, the second inequality 
follows from the fact that 
) /(1 ) (1
a a a
- - x x  is an increasing function. 
In  the second  step of  the proof we  consider  the slope  of  the  function  ) (h S P .  From  simple 
differentiation of (18), it follows that  0 > ) (h S P¢  if and only if  
  ), )(1 )(2 ( >
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where  )) 2 (1 ) (1 ))(1 2 (1 ) (1 (1 ) ( SO SO SI SI b ah b a b ah b a h - + - - - + - - º W .  The  following 
properties of the function  ) (h W  can be proven analytically   
    (i)  If  1/2 > ³ SO SI b b , then  0 < ) (h W¢ ,  [0,1] Î "h .  
    (ii)  If  SI SO b b < < 1/2 , then  0 > ) (h W¢ ,  [0,1] Î "h .  
    (iii)  If  SO SI b b > 1/2 > , the algebraic sign of  ) (h W¢  is ambiguous. However, in this case 
0 < ) (h W ¢ ¢ ,  [0,1] Î "h .  
These  properties  imply  that  (1)} (0), { min ) ( W W ³ W h ,  (0,1) , , Î " h a bk .  Without  loss  of 
generality, assume that  (0) < ) )(1 (1 = (1) W - - W SO SI ab ab .
39 Therefore, if inequality (41) holds 
for  (1) W , it holds a fortiori for  ) (h W ,  (0,1) Î "h . Utilizing  (1) W  in (41) yields a sufficient 
condition for  0 > ) (h S P¢ :  
                                                 
39The case  (0) > (1) W W  is symmetric and can be proven by analogy.   39 
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It can be seen immediately, that  0 = ) (× J  if  SO SI b b = . Furthermore, from simple differentiation 
of  ) ( SI b J  it follows that  0 > ) ( SI b J¢  if and only if  0 > ) )(1 )(1 (2 ) (1
2
SI SI SI b a a b ab - - - - - . It 
can be easily shown that this condition holds for all  (0,1) , Î SI b a . Therefore,  SO SI b b >  implies 
0 > ) ( SI b J  and thus  0 > ) (h S P¢ . 
Combining the results concerning the corner solutions of  ) (h S P  and its slope, it follows that 
there  exists  a  unique  (0,1) ˆ Î S h   such  that  1 < ) (h S P   for  all  ) ˆ (0, S h hÎ ,  1 > ) (h S P   for  all 
,1) ˆ ( S h hÎ  and  1 = ) (h S P  for  S h h ˆ = . The function  ) (h S P  from (18) is depicted in figure 2. 
This results can also be interpreted in terms of figure 7 from Appendix B. Consider first an 
industry with low headquarter intensity (high manufacturing components intensity),  M h . In this 
case, the second best outcome could be achieved if headquarters got a share 
*
M b  of the revenue. 
However, the actual bargaining shares are given by  SI b  and  SO b . Hence, by outsourcing the 
manufacturing production, the headquarter maximizes his profits. Consider next an industry with 
high headquarter intensity,  H h . Now, the second best would be achieved if  H  got a share 
*
H b  of 
the  revenue.  Given  the  industrial  structure,  the  headquarter  integrates  a  supplier  into  the 
production process in order to raise the highest profits. Proposition 1 implies the existence and 
uniqueness of cutoff  S h ˆ  (between the lines  SI b  and  SO b ) such that headquarters are indifferent 
between spot integration and spot outsourcing. 
 
D  Free entry condition and average productivity in the one-shot game 
We consider here only the first-best case, as corresponding conditions in the third-best case can 
be derived analogously. The free entry condition is set up along the lines of Helpman et al. 
(2004). Taking into account that both in the first-best profits (9) and the third-best profits (14), 
the productivity measure q  shows up with a common constant component  ( ) a a - 1 / , captured in 
) 1 /( a a q
- º Q , it proves convenient to define the distribution of firm sales as  
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 is a constant.
40 The transformation in (42) was obtained by 
utilizing the probability density function from (19) and integrating the resulting expression.  
Using (9), expected pure profits of a potential headquarter in the first-best case simplify to   
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where  ) (
* q G , 
* q and  ) (
* q L  are given by (19), (22) and (42), respectively. Since  0 = ) (¥ L  (due 
to assumption  1 > - s z ), the free entry condition from (21) simplifies to  
  . = )] ( [1 )] ( [ ) (1
* * 1 1




- - L - - -
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-  
Solving this equation for  X  yields an expression for aggregate consumption index in (22). This 
index can be utilized in (20) to obtain the cutoff productivity in the first best case.  
As  is  well-known  from  Melitz  (2003),  the  CES  price  index  (2)  can  be  rewritten  as 
*








s s × = × =
- - N p N P , where 
* ~















































d d   (43) 
) (q x  is the conditional distribution of  ) (q g  on  ] , [
* ¥ q  and  ) ( 1
* q G -  is the ex-ante probability 
of  successful  entry.  Using  the  definition  of  Pareto  productivity  from  (19),  the  average 
productivity can be rearranged as follows:
41 
























* - - - -













































E Proof of Lemma 2 
Lemma 2 (
* | p p p k k > º
H D
H
D ) holds if and only if (cf. (31) and (9)): 
                                                 
40Pareto-distributed variable has a well-defined (finite) variance if and only if  2 > z . To ensure that variance of the 
distribution of firm sales is finite and integral converges (i.e.,  0 = ) (¥ L ), we need to impose additionally  1 > - s z , 
where  1 > s  is the elasticity of substitution.   41 
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ah h a RHS LHS º - > - + - - - º
- - -  
In the first step of the proof we consider the corner solutions of both sides. We can establish: 





RHS LHS RHS LHS = > - + - = = =
- - h b h b
h h  
Next, consider the slopes of  ) (a LHS  and  ) (a RHS . The first order derivative of  RHS  with 
respect to a  is a constant:  1 ) ( ' - = a RHS . Bearing in mind the corner solutions from above, the 
sufficient condition for  ) (a LHS  to lie above  ) (a RHS  is  1 ) ( ' - > a LHS . Taking the first order 




































ah h a SC . 
It can be shown that  0 ) ( ' > a SC . Hence, if  1 ) 1 ( < SC  holds,  1 ) ( < a SC  holds a fortiori for all 
(0,1) Î a .  In  fact,  it  can  be  shown  that  1 ) 1 ( < SC   for  all  (0,1) , Î h b .  This  implies 
) ( ) ( a a RHS LHS >  and completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
 
F  Discussion of the case in which H  could freely choose 
*
R b  in the relational game 
If  H  could freely choose his revenue share under relational contracting (i.e., if  ) (b p
D  from (31) 
were a continuous function of  b ), he would minimize (31) with respect to  b  and would choose 
*
R b  that solves the following implicit function:  



















b b   (44) 
The following properties of 
*
R b  can be derived from the inspection of this function:   
(i)  For all  (0,1) , Î h a  there exists a unique 
*
R b  which solves (44). 
Proof. Note that (44) holds if and only if  















º    
With regard to the left-hand side LHS  of the equation above we establish  
                                                                                                                                                              
41Again, we used the assumption  1 > - s z  in the course of integration to assure that integrals converge.    42 
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As the range of the  ) , ( h a RHS  of equation above lies for all  (0,1) , Î h a  strictly between zero 
and infinity, there exists a single 
*
R b  that fulfills equation (44). 
(ii)  
*
R b  is a global minimum of (31). 
Proof. Taking the second derivative of (31) with respect to b  yields 
 

































As the second derivative is positive for all possible parameter values, 
*
R b  is a local minimum of 
(31). Bearing in mind that the root of (44) is unique, see property (i), 
*
R b  is simultaneously a 
global minimum of (31). 
(iii)  
*
R b  is increasing in h  for all  (0,1) , , Î b h a . 
Proof. By implicitly differentiating (44), we get after simplification   
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As  the  negative  term  in  the  squared  brackets  is  multiplied  with  another  negative  expression 
( 0 < 1) ( - b b ), the numerator of the above equation is positive.  
 
Figure 8 plots the implicit function (44) for all possible values of a , h,  (0,1) Î b . It can be seen 
that for given values of a  and h  there exists a unique bargaining share 
*
R b  that solves (44). This 
is also illustrated in two-dimensional figure 9 for given values of a . 
Although both  ) (
* h bR  from (44) and  ) (
* h bS  from (40) have positive slope, the intuition behind 
these results is different. Recall that in the spot game the headquarter would optimally choose 
) (
* h bS  in order to minimize joint underinvestment given by (12) and therefore to maximize joint 
profits from (14). In the relational game the headquarter would optimally choose  ) (
* h bR  in order 
to minimize joint deviation incentives given by (31) and therefore to minimize the MRT  in (34).   43 
 
 
   
Figure  8: Implicit function (44) for  (0,1) , ,
* Î R b h a .       Figure  9:  ) (
* h bR  for small (continuous  
    function) and high (dotted function) a . 
   
G  Proof of Proposition 2 
In the first step of the proof we consider the corner solutions of  ) (h R P . From equation (33) we 
can establish  
  1. <
) (1 ) (1
) (1 ) (1
= (1) and 1 >
) (1 ) (1


































The first inequality follows from  RO RI b b >  and the fact that  x x + - - - ) (1 ) (1 1
1
a a  is an increasing 
function of  x for all  (0,1) Î x  and  (0,1) Î a . Analogously, the second inequality follows from 
the fact that  ) (1 ) (1 1
1
a a - + - - x x  is a decreasing function. 
In  the second  step of  the proof we  consider  the slope  of  the  function  ) (h R P .  From  simple 
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  (45) 
whereas  ) (h R P  is given in equation (33). Since  0 > ] ln [1 x y- -a  holds for all  (0,1) , , Î x y a , all 
terms in squared brackets and therefore all fractions are positive. From this it follows that the left-
hand side of inequality (45) is smaller than zero. While  ) (h R P  is strictly positive, the sign of the 
second term on the right-hand side is ambiguous. Numerical simulation have shown that above 
inequality does not hold for all parameter values. Hence, the sign of  ) ( ' h R P  is ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, it can be proven analytically that (45) is fulfilled if evaluated at  1 = ) (h R P . To 
show this, denote the first fraction on the left-hand side of inequality (45) as  ) ( 1 RI T b  and the 
second fraction on the left-hand side of inequality (45) as  ) ( 2 RI T b . Both functions are positive 
and their first derivatives are given by  
  0. >
) (1
ln
= ) ( ' , 0 <
)) (1 (1
) (1 ln ) (1
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Therefore, if inequality (45) holds for  (1) 1 T , it holds a fortiori for all  (0,1) Î RI b . Analogously, if 
inequality (45) holds for  ) ( 2 RO RI T b b = , it holds a fortiori for all  ,1) ( RO RI b b Î . By substituting 
1 = RI b  and  RO RI b b =  respectively in the first ( ) ( 1 RI T b ) and second ( ) ( 2 RI T b ) term of the left-
hand side of inequality (45) and, by utilizing  1 = ) (h R P  on the right-hand of (45), it simplifies to  
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RO RO  
Since  this  inequality  holds  for  all  parameter  values,  the  function  ) ( ' h R P   if  evaluated  at 
1 = ) (h R P  has a negative slope for all  (0,1) , , Î k b h a . 
Next, it can be shown analytically that the polynomial  ) ( ' h R P  has degree 2.
42 Thus, the function 
) (h R P  has at most two extreme values. A possible run of the function  ) (h R P  is depicted in 
                                                 
42This can be seen from the highest exponent for h  in the numerator of the factorized equation  ) ( ' h R P . Elaborate 
calculations are available upon request.   45 
figure 4. Given our results concerning corner solutions, the slope and the  degree of polynomial 
) (h R P , it thus follows that there exists a unique  (0,1) ˆ Î R h  such that  1 > ) (h R P  for all  R h h ˆ < , 
1 < ) (h R P  for all  R h h ˆ > , and  1 = ) (h R P  for  R h h ˆ = . 
 
 
H  Average productivity in the repeated game 
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* p  and  k p  are given by (8) and (13), respectively. As in Appendix D, we can rewrite this 
index as 
rep
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Using the same approach as below equation (43), this term simplifies to:  
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It can be easily shown that  0 ) ( ' > l K  for all  (0,1) , , Î k b h a . Hence, by Lemma 3, the average 
productivity  in  the  repeated  game,  ) (
~
l q






























p z rep  is decreasing in l . 